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DUST IN THE WIND: IS TVA’S PERMIT 
SHIELD A DEATH KNELL FOR INTERSTATE 
PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS? 
Abstract: On July 26, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, held not 
only that the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempts state nuisance law, but also 
that the issuance of a CAA permit makes a public nuisance legally and 
theoretically impossible. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit established a 
considerable barrier to public nuisance suits. This Comment analyzes the 
legal viability of this decision and the implications of barring public nui-
sance in light of its growing popularity to address interstate air pollution 
and climate change. 
Introduction 
 Airborne particles, unfortunately, refuse to respect state bounda-
ries.1 Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA) coal-fired plants in Tennessee and Alabama trans-
form into fine particulate matter and ozone, which travel to North 
Carolina where they cause serious health impairments and environ-
mental damage.2 In search of relief, North Carolina sued the TVA un-
der its own public nuisance law.3 In July 2010, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit heard North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).4 The court had to decide whether en-
joining these unwieldy, interstate polluting particles under a public nui-
sance action was consistent with the structured program of the federal 
Clean Air Act (CAA), or if “vague public nuisance standards scuttle the 
                                                                                                                      
1 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA I ), 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 
815, 825 (W.D.N.C. 2009), vacated, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (TVA II ). 
2 See TVA I, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 819–24. Particulate matter can cause system-wide in-
flammation of the human body, changes in blood flow to the heart, brain and other vital 
organs, cardiac arrhythmia, infant mortality, increased incidence of asthma, chronic bron-
chitis and other cardiopulmonary illnesses. Id. at 821–22. Sulfites and nitrates lead to acid 
deposition in the soil and destruction of fine roots and plant matter. Id. at 823. Ozone 
exposure, similarly, damages vegetation and commercial crops. Id. at 824. Particulate mat-
ter, especially sulfate, impacts visibility by causing light to scatter, creating a haze over sce-
nic vistas. Id. at 824. 
3 See id. at 815. 
4 See 615 F.3d at 291. 
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nation’s carefully created system for accommodating the need for en-
ergy production and the need for clean air.”5 
 This Comment evaluates the TVA opinion with a specific emphasis 
on the Fourth Circuit’s impediments to public nuisance suits.6 Part I 
introduces the parties to the case and the legal doctrines at issue and 
provides a procedural summary of the district and appellate court deci-
sions.7 Part II then highlights the implications of TVA for future public 
nuisance litigation.8 Finally, Part III establishes the importance of pub-
lic nuisance jurisprudence to the Clean Air Act’s framework and evalu-
ates the Fourth Circuit’s most detrimental doctrinal weapon against 
public nuisance: the permit shield.9 
I. North Carolina’s Attempt to Abate TVA Pollutants 
 In 1933, Congress established the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), a corporation owned by the U.S. government to promote eco-
nomic development in the Tennessee Valley region.10 To achieve this 
end, the TVA produces, distributes, and sells electric power.11 Today, the 
TVA operates eleven coal-fired generating plants averaging fifty years 
old.12 All are located in Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky.13 These 
plants emit nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide, which create ozone and 
particulate matter downwind.14 All of these pollutants are regulated by 
the Clean Air Act (CAA).15 
 The CAA requires both federal and state action to abate air pollu-
tion.16 The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) develops 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for air pollutants, 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. at 296, 298. 
6 See infra notes 10–104 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 10–40 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 41–73 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 74–104 and accompanying text. 
10 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831ee (2006)). 
11 16 U.S.C. § 831d(l). 
12 John-Laurent Tronche, TVA Examining Aging Coal Plant Closure, Platts Energy Week, 
http://plattsenergyweektv.com/story.aspx?storyid=107686&catid=293 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2011). 
13 Final Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority at 19, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1623) [hereinafter TVA Brief]. 
14 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA I ), 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 
819–20 (W.D.N.C. 2009). 
15 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–.7, 50.9, 50.11, 50.13, 
50.15 (2010). 
16 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 7402, 7407 (2006). 
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and state agencies implement permitting programs calculated to achieve 
the NAAQS.17 These federal standards are a floor, not a ceiling, as the 
CAA permits states to impose stricter standards.18 
 North Carolina legislators exercised this right in 2002 by passing 
the North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act (CSA), which imposes 
stricter oxide emissions caps on state coal-fired plants.19 In order to 
fully address air pollution’s deleterious effects, however, the CSA also 
requires the state to use all available resources to induce its neighbor-
ing states and other entities to achieve similar reductions in oxide emis-
sions.20 As such, Attorney General Roy Cooper, on behalf of North 
Carolina, sued the TVA in 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina, claiming that unreasonable amounts of 
airborne particles from the TVA’s coal-fired plants pose a public nui-
sance by threatening the health of North Carolinians, the financial vi-
ability of the state, and the strength of its ecosystems.21 
 On interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit determined that a public nuisance cause of action is not barred 
by the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, held that the TVA had no 
sovereign immunity, and permitted the case to proceed in district 
court.22 In January 2009, after extensive findings regarding the emis-
sions of the plants and their health and environmental impacts, the 
district court applied the source state nuisance laws of Alabama and 
Tennessee to conclude that the emissions caused unreasonable dam-
ages to North Carolina.23 It then granted injunctions against the TVA, 
requiring the four closest coal-fired plants to upgrade or install certain 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. § 7407. 
18 Id. § 7416 (“[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State 
or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respect-
ing emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of 
air pollution . . . .”). 
19 Clean Smokestacks Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.107D (2009). 
20 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 79. 
21 See TVA I, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 815. North Carolina claimed that the damages cost the 
state billions of dollars in health care expenses, missed school and work days, plant dam-
age, and lost tourism. Id. 
22 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA II ), 615 F.3d 344, 350, 
352–53 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the “sue-and-be-sued” clause of 
the TVA Act waived sovereign immunity. See id. at 348. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
waived any Supremacy Clause protections by holding that public nuisance falls into the 
meaning of “requirement” in the CAA saving clause. See id. at 352–53. 
23 See TVA I, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 818–28, 829–30. The decision to apply source state nui-
sance law, rather than North Carolina’s nuisance law, derived from the Supreme Court 
case International Paper Co. v. Ouellette. See 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987). 
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pollution-reduction devices.24 Appealing again to the Fourth Circuit, 
the TVA did not contest the conclusion that North Carolina’s damages 
outweighed the costs of treating emissions.25 Instead, the TVA appealed 
the application of state law.26 
 The Fourth Circuit reversed the injunctions for three major reasons: 
(1) the CAA preempted state public nuisance law, (2) the decision 
amounted to an impermissible extraterritorial application of North 
Carolina’s CSA, and (3) public nuisance was “legally impossible” because 
the TVA’s emissions were legislatively authorized and, theoretically, the 
EPA’s NAAQS imposed a stricter standard than state nuisance law.27 
 The Fourth Circuit began by holding that public nuisance, being 
unpredictable and overly general, undermines the “carefully designed” 
CAA scheme, and, as such, the CAA preempts the application of state 
nuisance law in this instance.28 
 Next, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court improperly 
extended North Carolina’s CSA, which contradicted the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1987 holding in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette that source 
state law must apply to interstate nuisance claims.29 Expert testimony at 
                                                                                                                      
24 See TVA I, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 832. These injunctions would cost TVA approximately 
one billion dollars. TVA II, 615 F.3d at 298. 
25 See TVA Brief, supra note 13, at 15–16. 
26 See id. 
27 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 296. 
28 See id. at 302–03. According to the Fourth Circuit, judicial regulation of air pollution 
through nuisance law would lead to forum shopping, consideration of legal over techno-
logical demands, and injunction-driven improvements, all of which would undermine the 
uniform regulatory framework of the CAA. See id. at 302. 
29 Id. at 307, 309; see Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497. In Ouellette, Vermont citizens invoked 
Vermont state nuisance law in suing a New York paper mill for discharging pollutants into 
a shared water body. Id. at 483–84. The discharge was in fact authorized by the CWA per-
mitting scheme. Id. at 490 n.10. The Supreme Court held that the CWA’s saving clause 
preserves the right to a remedy only under the law of the source state, notwithstanding a 
comprehensive federal permitting scheme. Id. at 497–99. The Court thus rejected the de-
fendant’s claim that the CWA preempted all common law actions. Id. at 497–99. In addi-
tion, the Court held that the saving clause, by its terms, preserves common law actions 
under source state law. Id. at 497. As such, the Court remanded the case to district court to 
apply New York nuisance law. Id. at 500. Note that the saving clauses of the CWA and the 
CAA are nearly identical. Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006) (“Nothing 
in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have un-
der any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard . . . .”) (em-
phasis added), with Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006) (“Nothing in this section 
shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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trial relied on CSA emissions standards, rather than Tennessee and 
Alabama nuisance law.30 
 Notwithstanding the CAA’s preemption over state nuisance actions 
and the extraterritorial extension of North Carolina law, the Fourth 
Circuit deemed that the express legislative authorization of the power 
plants’ emissions precluded the possibility of a public nuisance.31 Ac-
cording to both Tennessee and Alabama common law, a legislatively 
authorized permit shields entities from nuisance liability.32 Further-
more, NAAQS protect “sensitive citizens,” for instance, children and 
other people particularly sensitive to air pollution due to disease; 
whereas nuisance law protects the “reasonable man,” or one with “or-
dinary health and sensibilities, and ordinary modes of living.”33 There-
fore, theoretically it would be impossible for emissions permitted by the 
more stringent NAAQS system to pose a public nuisance.34 
 Finally, the court assured North Carolina that other remedies be-
sides public nuisance claims exist.35 First, the Fourth Circuit suggested 
a section 126 petition.36 The CAA permits states to file such petitions to 
the EPA in the event that any source contributes significantly to the 
nonattainment of another state’s air quality standards.37 In fact, North 
Carolina initiated a section 126 petition in 2004, which was denied and, 
as of the date of the TVA opinion, awaited an appellate review.38 Sec-
ond, the court suggested participation in the comments period for the 
development of Tennessee’s and Alabama’s State Implementation 
Plans under the CAA.39 Finally, in the event of non-compliance of 
TVA’s permits, private action suits are available under the CAA.40 
                                                                                                                      
30 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 308. Although North Carolina, in its final brief, refuted the 
claim that expert testimony at trial relied on CSA standards, suggesting that the CSA de-
mands a system-wide cap, the district court applied a plant-by-plant analysis. Final Brief of 
Appellee State of North Carolina at 41–42, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09–1623). Furthermore, the trial court’s injunc-
tions resembled TVA’s own plan for emissions reductions, rather than that of the CSA. See 
id. 
31 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 309. 
32 See id. at 309–10. 
33 See id. at 310. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7426(b), 7410 (a)(2)(D) (2006). 
38 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
39 See TVA I, 615 F.3d at 311. 
40 Id. 
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II. Implications of the Fourth Circuit Decision 
 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in TVA could significantly change 
future environmental litigation on a number of fronts: (1) the feasibil-
ity of the nuisance doctrine, (2) the CAA’s preemption of public nui-
sance, (3) the judiciary’s participation in air pollution regulation, and 
(4) the viability of the permit shield defense.41 
 First, the decision represents a setback to public nuisance law, 
which increasingly has been invoked in high profile environmental 
cases.42 Current and future defendants subject to a public nuisance suit 
may use the Fourth Circuit’s disparaging language.43 In particular, the 
court stated that public nuisance doctrine “provide[s] almost no stan-
dard of application” and that it is “an ill-defined omnibus tort of last 
resort.”44 
 Second, the TVA court’s holding that the CAA preempts source 
state law represents a major shift in interstate pollution jurisprudence 
and a serious disadvantage for plaintiffs seeking relief outside the CAA 
regulatory framework.45 This holding created a circuit split and was 
arguably inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette that the CAA’s saving clause preserves com-
                                                                                                                      
41 See infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
42 See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (permitting 
coastal land owners to bring a putative class action against oil and energy companies, claim-
ing that their greenhouse gas emissions led to climate change and posed a public nuisance), 
vacated, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (lacking quorum); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 310 (2nd Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim of public 
nuisance and that such a claim against electric power companies was justiciable). See generally 
Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing at the 
Right Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197 (2010) (establishing that public nuisance litigation could 
provide environmental justice with regard to climate change); Christine A. Klein, The New 
Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1155 (2007) 
(noting a shift in nuisance law towards a more offensive tool used to institute changes in 
environmental legislation). 
43 Telephone Interview with Matthew M. Pawa, Principal, Law Offices of Matthew M. 
Pawa, P.C., (Sept. 7, 2010) (lead counsel in Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309). Product manu-
facturers, particularly of lead paint, have similarly succeeded over the years at building a body 
of case law that disparages the tort of nuisance as a tool for plaintiffs. See Peter Tipps, Note, 
Controlling the Lead Paint Debate: Why Control Is Not an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 
605, 605–06 (2009). 
44 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA II ), 615 F.3d 291, 302 
(4th Cir. 2010). 
45 See R. Trent Taylor, Fourth Circuit Reverses $1 Billion Injunction Related to Air Emissions in 
State of North Carolina v. TVA, McGuireWoods LLP (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.mcguire 
woods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4997; see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 
481, 497 (1987) (“The saving clause specifically preserves other state actions . . . .”). 
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mon law actions under source state law.46 As such, this holding may 
create the most controversy; indeed, it is upon this basis that North 
Carolina sought a rehearing en banc.47 
 The Fourth Circuit in TVA was cautious not to hold “flatly” that the 
CAA preempts the entire field of emissions regulation.48 It still held, 
however, that a “strong cautionary presumption” against nuisance ac-
tions exists, as such suits “interfere[] with the methods by which the 
federal statute was designed to reach its goal.”49 The CAA preempted 
state public nuisance law by virtue of conflict preemption because addi-
tional state regulation through public nuisance law would conflict with 
the CAA's explicit role for states of implementing NAAQS.50 
 The holding in Ouellette, however, was that source state law may 
coexist with federal legislation without disrupting the CAA’s regulatory 
framework.51 Furthermore, the CAA’s saving clause expressly preserves 
the state’s role to institute common law relief, by stating, “[n]othing in 
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of per-
sons) may have under any statute or common law to seek . . . any other 
relief . . . .”52 
 The Fourth Circuit did not simply ignore the CAA’s saving 
clause.53 It compared it to a saving clause analyzed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1983 in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Development Commission, which held that states could continue 
to regulate nuclear power plants in their capacity as utilities, but that 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497; Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 310, 375 n.42, 378 (permit-
ting plaintiffs to bring a public nuisance claim within the purview of the CAA and eschewing 
the conclusion that the CAA is so comprehensive as to displace other actions); Her Majesty 
the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 342–43 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plain 
language of the saving clause, congressional intent, and Supreme Court precedent indicates 
that the CAA does not preempt state action). 
47 See State of North Carolina’s Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing 
en banc at 5, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 302 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1623). 
48 TVA II, 615 F.3d at 302–03. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at 303. 
51 See 479 U.S. at 498–500 (holding that “the application of the source State’s law does 
not disturb the balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests” and that 
“[n]othing in the Act prevents a court sitting in an affected State from hearing a common-
law nuisance suit . . . .”). 
52 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006) (emphasis added). The Court in Ouellette 
also held that the “saving clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for 
state causes of action.” 479 U.S. at 492. 
53 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 303–04. 
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the federal government maintained domain over safety regulations.54 
From this, the Fourth Circuit in TVA reasoned that state law cannot 
regulate that which federal law regulates.55 Thus, the CAA’s saving 
clause could not apply in this instance because state law regulated 
within the purview of the CAA.56 
 Third, the Fourth Circuit in TVA disparaged the judiciary’s role in 
air pollution regulation.57 Unlike courts, the court reasoned, agency 
experts are able to promulgate regulations based on the latest scientific 
data.58 Furthermore, input through the required notice and comments 
period allows many perspectives to be considered, resulting in a proac-
tive regulatory process.59 The CAA framework also promotes uniform 
application of air quality standards and the reliance interests of indus-
try.60 Litigation may breed distortions and inconsistencies and is far 
more costly than agency decision-making.61 Finally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in TVA held that a public nuisance is legally and theoretically im-
possible because the power generating operations of the plants were 
expressly permitted by law.62 First, Alabama and Tennessee “permit 
shield” case law precluded public nuisance claims regarding legisla-
tively authorized activities.63 Second, the Fourth Circuit constructed a 
theoretical argument suggesting a physical impossibility of a CAA per-
mitted emission source posing a public nuisance.64 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 203–13 (1983)). 
55 See id. (reasoning that applying state nuisance law and imposing injunctions on the 
TVA amounts to replacing “comprehensive federal emissions regulations with a contrasting 
state perspective about the emissions levels necessary to achieve those same public ends”). 
56 See id. The Fourth Circuit also relied on additional language from Ouellette—stating 
that “if affected states were allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a single 
point source, the inevitable result would be a serious interference with the achievement of 
the ‘full purpose and objectives of Congress’” —to hold that the Supreme Court did not 
intend affected states to impose separate discharge standards. Id. (quoting Ouellette, 479 
U.S. at 493–94). The context of this statement in Ouellette is the construction of the Su-
preme Court’s argument that source state law must be applied in public nuisance cases, 
rather than affected state law, and not that state law is preempted entirely. See 479 U.S. at 494 
(“Because we do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute 
through a general saving clause, we conclude that the CWA precludes a court from apply-
ing the law of an affected state against an out-of-state source.”) (emphasis added). 
57 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 304. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 305. 
60 See id. at 306. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 309--10. 
63 TVA II, 615 F.3d at 309–10. 
64 See id. at 310. 
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 There may be gaps, however, in the Fourth Circuit’s permit shield 
holding.65 The permit shield cases cited apply only to activities author-
ized by local zoning laws.66 Furthermore, Alabama has a more recent 
case on point that holds that compliance with the Alabama Air Pollu-
tion Control Act does not shield against liability.67 Tennessee also has a 
more recent and applicable case.68 In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Tennessee v. Champion International Corp., vacated a decision by the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court due to its failure to recognize public nuisance 
where the discharge was legislatively authorized.69 As such, Champion 
International’s permit shield is no longer good law in Tennessee.70 
 The Fourth Circuit further held that nuisance suits are not only 
legally barred by virtue of state permit shield law, but also “logically” 
impossible because NAAQS imposes a more stringent “sensitive citizen” 
standard than the “reasonable” standard required by public nuisance 
doctrine.71 Therefore, the court reasoned, compliance with NAAQS 
precludes the possibility of a public nuisance.72 If federal circuits or the 
Supreme Court adopted this doctrine, public nuisance cases could be 
disposed of regardless of the source state permit shield law.73 
III. The Necessity of Public Nuisance Notwithstanding the CAA 
 This Part addresses two issues.74 First, it argues that state public 
nuisance law should survive within the purview of the CAA frame-
work.75 Second, it suggests that the Fourth Circuit’s boost for the per-
                                                                                                                      
65 See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
66 See Birmingham v. Fairfield, 375 So.2d 438, 438 (Ala. 1979) (placement of drainage 
pipes); Johnson v. Bryant, 350 So.2d 433, 433 (Ala. 1977) (extension of pier); Birmingham v. 
Scogin, 115 So.2d 505, 512 (Ala. 1959) (operation of a garbage dump); Fricke v. Guntersville, 
36 So.2d 321, 322 (Ala. 1948) (placement of drainage ditches); Branyon v. Kirk, 191 So. 345, 
349 (Ala. 1939) (placement of sidewalks); O’Neil v. State ex rel. Baker, 206 S.W.2d 780, 780–81 
(Tenn. 1947) (construction of a liquor store); Fey v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 64 S.W.2d 
61, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933) (gas pipes). 
67 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 526 (Ala. 1979). 
68 See State v. Champion Int’l Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569, 574, 576 (Tenn. 1986), vacated, 
479 U.S. 1061 (1987) (holding that a permit to discharge under the CWA foreclosed the 
possibility of public nuisance). 
69 See 479 U.S. 1061, 1061 (1987). 
70 See id. 
71 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 309–10; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (2010). 
72 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 310. 
73 See id. 
74 See infra notes 75–104 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
52 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
mit shield defense is misguided and poses a major threat to the future 
of public nuisance suits.76 
 The Fourth Circuit presented laudable reasons for eliminating 
public nuisance claims within the CAA framework.77 Certainly, expos-
ing industry to the uncertain and general public nuisance standard 
would breed litigiousness and unreliability.78 Public nuisance suits 
could threaten the framework created by Congress to achieve a balance 
between clean air and energy production.79 
 Nonetheless, public nuisance may coexist within the CAA frame-
work.80 Public nuisance can be a check on administrative agencies in 
the face of uncertain atmospheric science and wind patterns.81 More 
importantly, it ensures relief for underrepresented or disenfranchised 
parties who are unable to aptly participate in the permitting process.82 
In short, public nuisance claims are a necessary component of air pol-
lution regulation.83 Congress even envisioned this opportunity by virtue 
of the express language of the saving clause.84 
                                                                                                                      
 
76 See infra notes 88–104 and accompanying text (cautioning against the permit shield 
doctrine). 
77 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA II ), 615 F.3d 291, 301 
(4th Cir. 2010). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 296. 
80 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–99 (1987) (“[A]pplication of the 
source State’s law does not disturb the balance among federal, source-state, and affected-
state interests.”). 
81 See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
Iowa L. Rev. 545, 579 (2007) (establishing that the federal government’s failure to address 
modern environmental concerns has introduced a new role for state and local governments, 
as well as for state common law, to ameliorate environmental issues); Susannah Landes 
Weaver, Setting Air Quality Standards: Science and the Crisis of Accountability, 22 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 
379, 386 (2009) (noting “the tremendous complexity of ecosystems, and, consequently, the 
great scientific uncertainty associated with our understanding of the relationship of envi-
ronmental factors to human health”). Some scholars have expressed serious concern over 
the federal regulatory framework’s ability to address modern environmental issues. See, e.g., 
Klass, supra, at 579–80 (emphasizing the failure of the federal regulatory system and the im-
portance of state common law in addressing environmental issues); Wendy E. Wagner, Admin-
istrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1321, 1409 (2010) 
(demonstrating shortcomings of the public hearing process); Weaver, supra, at 389–90 (estab-
lishing imperfection of regulations based on scientific data alone). 
82 See Wagner, supra note 81, at 1321, 1374–84 (establishing that information capture 
by administrative agencies faces three major challenges: imbalances in resources of the 
parties, information “symbiosis” between the agency and the industry, and imbalance in 
participation in the public hearing process due to cost). 
83 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
84 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in TVA certainly 
helped provide future defendants with many arguments to evade nui-
sance suits: (1) strong language against public nuisance doctrine and 
judicial involvement in air pollution disputes, (2) preemption of state 
public nuisance law by the CAA framework, and (3) use of the permit 
shield defense.85 The first is dicta, and the second will likely be over-
turned by virtue of International Paper Co. v. Ouellette and the express 
language of the CAA’s saving clause.86 The third argument, however, 
could pose a serious obstacle in future environmental litigation, as 
many states have similar permit shield cases.87 
 In invoking the permit shield defense, the Fourth Circuit relied on 
testimony from Tennessee’s Deputy Air Director indicating that permit 
officials address the same factors considered in a nuisance case.88 As 
such, the Fourth Circuit held that, barring negligence, it is impossible 
for such an activity to actually pose a public nuisance.89 The basis of this 
reasoning is the assumption that the permitting process is sufficient in 
its ability to predict public nuisances.90 It is a difficult task, however, to 
predict all public nuisances, due to the complexity of the interaction of 
environmental factors and human health.91 Therefore, the TVA court’s 
reasoning may leave many without a remedy.92 
                                                                                                                      
 
. . . .”); S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 249 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3582 (“To 
assure that such a preemption of State or local law, whether statutory or common, does 
not occur, environmental legislation enacted by the Congress has consistently evidenced 
great care to preserve state and local authority and the consequent remedies available to 
citizens injured by the release of harmful substances into the environment.”). 
85 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 296. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (expressly permitting state action); Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 500 
(contradicting TVA’s holding); TVA II, 615 F.3d at 296 (indicating criticism of nuisance 
doctrine not necessary to holding). 
87 See, e.g., Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 1 A.3d 1171, 1180 (Conn. App. 2010); Young v. 
Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (Ill. 2004); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, 
Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48, 53 (N.C. App. 2002); Brading v. Cnty. of Georgetown, 490 S.E.2d 4, 8 
(S.C. 1997); Atkinson v. City of Pierre, 706 N.W.2d 791, 797 (S.D. 2005). 
88 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 310. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (establishing potential and actual gaps 
in the federal environmental regulatory system). 
92 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. Some scholars have argued that pre-
cluding public nuisance violates due process. See Robert L. Glickman, Federal Preemption and 
Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 179, 182 (1985) (demonstrating 
due process issues with preemption of state common law relief); W. David Slawson, The 
Right to Protection from Air Pollution, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 667, 674–75 (1986) (arguing that 
protection from air pollution is a right and that separation of powers demands judicial 
involvement). See generally Jan Erik Hasselman, Comment, Alaska’s Nuisance Statute Revisited: 
54 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
 The Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Alabama and Tennessee permit 
shield cases was unsuitable, as all of them applied to legislative authori-
zation on the local level.93 The permitting process on the local level is 
not analogous to federal and state-wide permitting; therefore, applying 
local permit shields to the CAA framework is improper.94 The noxious 
uses on which TVA relied (for example, placement of discharge pipes, 
liquor stores, and waste treatment facilities) have more predictable and 
localized effects than the complicated activities of primary pollutants in 
the atmosphere amidst capricious weather patterns.95 Furthermore, the 
permitting process at the local level is more accessible to potentially 
aggrieved parties.96 
 The construction of a national permit shield was equally mis-
guided.97 The EPA’s “sensitive citizen” standard is a commendable goal, 
but the extent to which the NAAQS consider or protect sensitive popu-
lations is unclear.98 As such, precluding public nuisance on the assump-
tion that this goal has been achieved is imprudent and may foreclose 
remedies for people negatively affected by air pollution.99 
 Without a public nuisance claim, the only form of relief is through 
the CAA’s administrative proceedings.100 As such, the Fourth Circuit 
excludes the opportunity to “end run” this regulatory process, which 
often provides only stagnant relief.101 Moreover, affected states are 
technically those within fifty miles of the source.102 In addition, partici-
                                                                                                                      
 
Federal Substantive Due Process Limits to Common Law Abrogation, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
347 (1997) (criticizing a statutory permit shield as a violation of due process). 
93 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 66. 
94 See infra notes 95–97. 
95 See Weaver, supra note 81, at 386. The “great scientific uncertainty” that concerned 
Weaver is not as severe at the local level and in some cases, is nonexistent. Compare, e.g., 
O’Neil v. State ex rel. Baker, 206 S.W.2d 780, 780–81 (Tenn. 1957) (dealing with the con-
struction of a liquor store), and Branyon v. Kirk, 191 So. 345, 349 (Ala. 1939) (dealing with 
placement of sidewalks), with Weaver, supra note 81, at 386. 
96 See Wagner, supra note 81, at 1321, 1374–84. The information capture challenges at 
the federal agency level would also be less severe at the local level, where the subject mat-
ter is not as complex and participation is less costly. See id. 
97 See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
98 Jamie Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 Calif. L. 
Rev. 171, 198–99 (2005) (noting the difficulty of identifying and protecting the “sensitive 
citizen” subgroup). 
99 See id. 
100 See TVA II, 615 F.3d at 310. 
101 See id. North Carolina began this process in March 2004 by petitioning the EPA to 
establish control requirements for power plants in thirteen other states; as of the date of 
the TVA opinion, the outcome was still pending. Id. at 311. 
102 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2010). Oxides, however, can travel hundreds of miles from their 
source. Interstate and International Air Pollution, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/inter- 
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pating in the public hearing process could only occur every five years 
for permit renewal.103 In fact, in TVA, sixteen states filed amicus briefs 
in support of preserving states’ rights to bring common law nuisance 
suits to protect citizens against interstate pollution.104 
Conclusion 
 TVA introduces many questions regarding the sufficiency of the 
CAA. The difficulty of understanding the interactions between primary 
pollutants, atmospheric chemistry, weather patterns, human health, and 
ecosystems present a weighty task for the agency experts. As such, in the 
tradition of American government, the judiciary and common law doc-
trines must act as a check on this regulatory framework to ameliorate 
gaps or missteps in the permitting process. Knowing that such gaps and 
missteps are inevitable, the Fourth Circuit was misguided to conclude 
that a permit to emit under the CAA precludes a finding of public nui-
sance ab initio. Such a conclusion would leave many without relief from 
the deleterious health and environmental impacts of air pollution. 
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